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HOW FLEXIBLE IS COMMUNITY LAW? AN 
UNUSUAL APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT 
OF "TWO SPEEDS"t 
Claus-.Dieter Ehlermann* 
I. THE ''Two SPEED'. DEBATE 
Since Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, launched the idea in Paris in November, 1974, that the Community 
might progress faster if its economically stronger Member States were al-
lowed to develop more quickly, 1 the debate on the concept of a "two ( or 
multi) speed" Community has not slackened. Indeed, the discussion has 
intensified in recent years, and it will likely continue as long as the underly-
ing reasons remain with us. Those reasons include the conviction that the 
Community has lost its original impetus, the slowdown in the decisionmak-
ing process through the search for consensus (though majority voting would 
be legally possible), and the increased difficulty of reaching unanimity in a 
Community enlarged first from six to nine, then to ten and probably soon to 
twelve Member States. In addition, the successive accessions have made 
the Community more heterogeneous, and the prosperous years before the 
first enlargement have been replaced by a difficult period of economic 
adaptation. 
Clearly, the "two speed" concept is closely linked to other proposals for 
institutional reform; it would lose much of its appeal if majority voting were 
to become more popular and, in particular, If such voting could be used in 
those areas where the Treaty today requires a unanimous decision of the 
Council.2 Though it would certainly be wrong to assume that all promoters 
of the "two speed" concept agree with the consensus principle as practised 
in Brussels, they would have to admit that their instrument of reform di-
minishes the pressure for a reinstatement and extension of the rule regard-
ing majority voting. 
The concept of "two speeds" de lege ferenda and the connected question 
of possible flexibility in Community law de lege /ata raise a number of 
highly complex institutional questions that go to the very roots of the Com-
munity system. We offer the following analysis of such questions to Eric 
t The views expressed in this Article are strictly personal. 
• Director-General, Legal Service, Commission of the European Co=unities; Doctorate 
in Law 1955, Heidelberg University. - Ed. 
I. Address given to the Organisation Fran~ise du Mouvement Europeen, Paris, Nov. 19, 
1974, 30 EA D33 (1975). 
2. See, e.g., the Commission's suggestions for adjustments of the Treaties in Enlargement of 
tire Community: Transitional period and institutional implications, 1978 BULL, EUR. COMM,, 
Supp. 2, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Enlargement of tire Community]. A revised version of these 
suggestions is published in Institutional Implications of Enlargement: More Flexibility in Deci-
sion-Making, 1983 COM 116 final (Mar. I, 1983), and mentioned in 1983 BULL. EUR, COMM,, 
No. 3, at 76. 
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Stein, whose writing and teaching have contributed so greatly to the under-
standing of the Community's foundations. 
A. The "Two Speed" Concept 
There is no generally accepted definition of the "two speed" concept or 
of any other term ("two-tier" Community; "Europe a geometrie variable"; 
"Europe a la carte"; "abgP-stufte Integration") that is used to designate the 
same or a similar phenomenon. For the sake of simplicity, we will limit 
ourselves to quoting the well-known and relatively precise formula used by 
Leo Tindemans, then Prime Minister of Belgium, in his December, 1975, 
report to the European Council on European Union. In his chapter on eco-
nomic and monetary policy Tindemans states: 
It must be possible to allow that: 
- within the Community framework of an overall concept of European 
Union as defined in this report and accepted by the Nine, 
- and on the basis of an action programme drawn up in a field decided 
upon by the common institutions, whose principles are accepted by all, 
(1) those States which are able to progress have a duty to forge ahead, 
(2) those States which have reasons for not progressing which the Council, 
on a proposal from the Commission, acknowledges as valid do not do so, 
- but will at the same time receive from the other States any aid and 
assistance that can be given them to enable them to catch the others up, 
- and will take part, within the joint institutions, in assessing the results 
obtained in the field in question.3 
Tindemans does not raise the question whether his proposal conforms with 
the Treaties; he refers, however, to article 233 of the EEC Treaty - the 
Benelux clause - as a precedent.4 
B. Legal Analysis: The State of Play 
So far, the debate over the "two speed·' concept has been essentially 
political. While its promoters have pointed to possible advantages, its op-
ponents have stressed the dangers that would flow from the acceptance of 
such a decisionmaking technique. Solid legal analysis is rather rare. We 
have identified only two publications dealing specifically with our subject 
- the first by E. Grabitz and B. Langeheine,5 and the second, rather more 
detailed, by B. Langeheine alone.6 Since the first seems to have been a 
preliminary study for the second, we will refer mainly to the second 
publication. 
Langeheine arrives at the conclusion that a "two speed" concept similar 
to Tindemans' suggestion is in principle compatible with the EEC Treaty, 
provided it is not used in core areas of the Common Market and in the 
3. Cj European llnion: Report by Mr Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, lo the 
European Council, 1976 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. l, at 20, 21 . 
4. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Co=unity, Mar. 28, 1957, art. 233, 
298 U.N.T.S. l l (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
5. Grabitz & Langeheine,Lega/ Problems Related lo a Proposed "Two-Tier System" of Inte-
gration within the European Community, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 33 (1981). 
6. Langeheine, Abgestufle Integration, 18 EuR 227 (1983). 
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Community's external relations.7 However, Langeheine subjects the appli-
cation of the "two speed" formula to one fundamental condition: the "two 
speed" technique can be used only if all Member States agree; it is excluded 
in areas controlled by majority voting. 8 This unanimity requirement is 
astonishing. We must take it as an indication that he is afraid of the logical 
consequences of his interpretation. And we must admit that we are unable 
to agree with the condition of unanimity: under existing Community law, 
consensus is not a valid argument in favor of legality.9 Nor is it one even 
on a strictly practical level, as it cannot prevent individuals and companies 
from enforcing their rights before the courts. Only a Treaty amendment 
could transform the unanimity requirement into a decisive, legalizing 
factor. 
C. The "Two Speed" Concept -A Complex Treaty Amendment 
Contrary to the views expressed by Grabitz and Langeheine, the Com-
mission has always maintained that introduction of the "two speed" con-
cept in its pure and simple form (i.e., without legally acceptable reasons for 
nonparticipation) would require a Treaty amendment. If one reflects on the 
type of questions that would be raised during the amendment process, and 
that would have to be answered by the negotiators, it becomes clear that 
such an amendment would have to be much more complex than expected at 
.first sight. The questions concern (1) the type of Community activities open 
to "two speed" operations; (2) the requirements as to the participating (and 
nonparticipating) Member States; (3) the decisionmaking process; ( 4) the 
financing of "two speed" operations; and (5) the consequences of such oper-
ations on the external powers of the Community. We will briefly set out the 
most important of these problems. 
I. Type of Community Activities Open to "Two Speed" Operations 
The .first issue is whether "two speed" operations should be allowed in 
all areas in which the Community can act or whether they should be re-
stricted to certain precisely delimited fields. Other open issues include 
whether "two-speed" operations should be unrestricted or subject to sub-
stantive conditions, and whether they should be allowed only for new activ-
ities, or also with respect to existing Community rules ("acquis 
communautaire"). 
2. Requirements as to the Participating (and Nonparticipating) 
Member States 
The possibility of nonparticipation could be limited to certain Member 
States, or all Member States could have the right to "stay behind." In either 
case, it might be useful to require a certain number of participating Mem-
ber States in order to attain a critical mass. 
7. Langeheine requires "objective reasons" for nonparticipation in decisions taken by the 
Community; however, he also accepts "reasons of a political nature." See id. at 230 [Author's 
translation - Ed.]. 
8. See kl. at 254-57. 
9. See Part 11-C-l & note 76 infra. 
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3. The Decisionmaking Process 
A "two speed" operation will normally consist of one basic decision 
(which will allow one or several Member States not to apply it during a 
fixed or open-ended period), amendments to this basic decision, detailed 
rules for its application and implementation and, where appropriate, day-
to-day management decisions of a purely ephemeral character. 
What is the position of those Member States that are allowed not to 
participate in the scheme? Is it conceivable that they should be excluded_ 
from participation in the adoption of the basic decisions or from the adop-
tion of amendments to the basic decisions, even though they are expected to 
apply it at some time in the future? Should they be excluded from the for-
mulation of the detailed rules for its application and implementation? And 
from day-to-day management? 
The numerical thresholds for majority decisions by the Council 10 are 
based on the assumption that all Member States participate in the voting 
process. For majority decisions not involving all Member States, different, 
i.e., lower, thresholds would have to be agreed upon. These new thresholds 
would have to take into account the voting weight of those Member States 
not entitled to vote on the given issues. 11 
4. Financing of "Two Speed" Operations 
Some "two speed" operations, particularly those involving research, in-
dustrial development, or restructuring of industries, require financial 
means. Should such operations be paid for out of the general Community 
budget, i.e., financed by the Community's own resources? Should Commu-
nity resources coming from a nonparticipating Member State be refunded 
(totally or only in part)? Or should "two speed" operations be financed, 
like the present supplementary research programmes, by special contribu-
tions from participating Member States?12 
10. Cf. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 148(2) (providing a weighted voting system for 
Council decisions taken by qualified majority). 
11. Langeheine, supra note 6, at 258, suggests a gentleman's agreement according to which 
Member States that choose to stay behind should abstain. That is a perfectly workable sugges-
tion for unanimous Council decisions, which cannot be blocked by an abstention. Cf. EEC 
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 148(3). But it is inappropriate where majority voting is called for, 
because it is generally agreed that an abstention cannot be considered a positive vote. Ex-
pressed differently, article 148(3) is not applicable, mutatis mutandis, in the case of majority 
voting. 
12. See Part II-A-8 infra for discussion of the supplementary research programmes. 
The financing of "two speed" operations poses a real problem for Langeheine, who applies 
the Treaty without any amendment. He suggests limiting such operations, during an experi-
mental phase, to actions that do not require spending on the Co=unity level. Langeheine, 
supra note 6, at 258-59. This is, once again, a perfectly acceptable suggestion. We cannot 
agree, however, with his statement that it would be theoretically possible today (i.e., without 
any Treaty amendment!) to finance "two speed" operations without using the budget, through 
special contributions from the participating Member States. His position is not compatible 
with art. 199 of the EEC Treaty ("All items of revenue and expenditure of the Co=unity ... 
shall be shown in the budget"), or with art. 4 of the Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, 
Euratom, on the Replacement of Financial Contributions from Member States by the Com-
munities' own Resources, [Special Ed. 1970 (I)] O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 94/19) 224, 226 (Apr. 
28, 1970) ("the budget of the Co=unities shall, irrespective of other revenue, be financed 
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5. Consequences of "Two Speed" Operations on the External Powers of 
the Community 
Today it is generally recognized that the Community's external powers 
are not limited to those provisions which expressly deal with international 
affairs. 13 According to the Court of Justice: 
Whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the Com-
munity powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a spe-
cific objective, the Community has authority to enter into the international 
commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the 
absence of an express [authorizing] provision. 14 
This international authority becomes an exclusive power insofar as the 
Community has adopted common rules that might be affected by an inter-
national agreement. Only the Community is entitled to negotiate and con-
clude such an agreement.15 
Is a "two speed" operation equivalent to "common rules" conferring an 
exclusive international power with respect to all (i.e., also the nonparticipat-
ing) Member States? Or does an exclusive power exist only in relation to 
those Member States that do participate in the operation? 16 If this latter 
alternative is correct, the Community might be unable to commit the whole 
of its territory; as a consequence, we might see the birth of a new type of 
mixed agreement. 17 
D. The Position of the Commission 
We do not know to what extent the promoters of the "two speed" con-
cept have been aware of the institutional complexities of their proposal. If 
they had fully realized these difficulties, they might have adopted a more 
prudent approach, for instance, that expressed by the Commission. In its 
considerations on the institutional implications of the second and third en-
largements the Commission stated: 
The basic feature of the Community's legal system is the principle that 
there should be a single body of secondary legislation. This principle is 
clearly set out in the second paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, 
which states that a regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
This principle ofuniversality does not imply the uniformity of Commu-
nity law. On the contrary, the Court of Justice has ruled that the principle 
of non-discrimination is a general principle of law binding on all Commu-
nity bodies. So different cases must be handled in different ways. And the 
only way of distinguishing between fundamental and incidental differences 
is to refer to the principles and objectives on which the Treaty is founded. 
entirely from the Communities' own resources."). Article 4(6) of that Decision, referring to 
supplementary research progra=es, is the only exception to that principle. 
13. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 113, 238. 
14. Advisory Opinion 1/76, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 741, 755 (emphasis added). 
15. Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Council of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 
22/70), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, 275-76 (grounds 28, 31) (AETR). 
16. Surprisingly, this aspect of the "two speed" concept has not been discussed at all by 
legal authors. 
11. See generally MIXED AGREEMENTS (D. O'Keeffe & H.G. Schermers eds. 1983). 
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This means, for instance, that the unity of the common market should not 
be put at risk, that - in the context of the harmonization of legislation -
existing differences between Member States should not be aggravated, and 
that any deferred or differentiated application of Community law should 
cease as soon as circumstances allow. 
Given the greater heterogeneity of an enlarged Community, it might be 
advisable to write into the Treaty itself some definition of the criteria and 
limitations governing the type of differentiated application that would be 
compatible with the principles and aims of the Community.18 
In spite of the last paragraph, which prudently suggests a treaty amend-
ment, this is not a proposal to introduce a "two speed" concept, but a plea 
for flexibility within the existing Community framework. 19 The key sen-
tence seems to be the first one of the second paragraph, which is even 
clearer in French than in the English translation.20 It recognizes a funda-
mental principle, hardly perceived in the early years of the Community, 
which has become more and more apparent since the first enlargement. 
Whatever may happen to the "two speed" concept, the Community will 
need the existing possibilities for differentiated application;21 it will increas-
ingly use the flexibility that the Treaty already offers. The following pages 
will demonstrate and analyze this flexibility. 
IL THE FLEXIBILITY OF EXISTING COMMUNITY LAW 
Before analyzing, in general terms and in theory, the possibilities for 
and limits of differentiated application, it is useful to look at practical ex-
amples in existing Community legislation. Before we tum to regulations 
and directives adopted by the Council, we will briefly examine the Treaty22 
in order to identify those instruments of flexibility that the founders used. 
It seems likely that their followers have imitated them, so that secondary 
Community legislation simply repeats techniques that were successfully ap-
plied earlier. 
A. Flexibility in the Treaty (Primary Community Law) 
1. The most important device ensuring flexibility is undoubtedly the 
principle of progressiveness ( or gradualness) which materializes essentially 
in the transitional period and its different stages.23 It should be 
remembered that progression from one stage to another entailed not only 
18. Enlargement of the Community, supra note 2, ~ 52, at 17. 
19. A more skeptical reader of this passage is Dewost, L'application territoriale du droit 
communautaire: Disparition et resurgence de la notion defrontiere, in LA FRONTIERE 253, 267 
(Societe Fran~ise pour le Droit International, 1980). 
20. "Le principe de l'unicite n'implique pas l'uniformite du droit com.munautaire." La 
periode de transition et !es consequences institutionnelles de /'elargissement, 1978 BULL. COMM. 
EUR., Supp. 2, at 18. . 
21. We will use this term as a synonym for de lege /ala admissible differences in Commu-
nity law. 
22. The following analysis will focus on the EEC Treaty and legislation enacted under this 
Treaty. However, the results apply equally, mutatis mutandis, to the ECSC and the 
EURA TOM Treaties. 
23. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8. 
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amendments to substantive law,24 but also changes in institutional rules.25 
2. Increased flexibility is provided for in areas where the elimination of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons is 
attributed to decisions of the Council. However, the Court of Justice has 
limited this flexibility in most cases to the end of the transitional period.26 
3. Though it is doubtful whether it is right to cite in this context provi-
sions that allow Member States to apply restrictions justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health,27 we would like to refer ex-
pressly to article 224, which allowed a major operation of differentiation 
during the Falklands crisis.28 
4. Safeguard clauses are an instrument of flexibility par excellence. The 
Treaty is full of them. Most of these clauses were limited in time (principle 
of progressiveness!);29 others are still available.30 It should be noted that 
the prolonged authorization of safeguard clauses can be a powerful means 
of differentiation in the application of Community law.31 
5. All Treaty provisions mentioned so far are identical for all Member 
States. Others distinguish among the ten Member States, particularly the 
rules concerning the composition of the European Parliament32 and the 
24. See, e.g., the provisions on the gradual abolition of customs duties, quantitative restric-
tions, taxes and measures of equivalent effect in intra-Community trade and the progressive 
application of the common customs tariff, EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 12-1S. 
2S. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 43(2), 75(1), 114 (providing for the change 
from unanimous to qualified majority decisionmaking). 
26. See Charmasson v. Minister for Economic Affairs & Finance (Paris) (Case No. 48/74), 
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1383; 1396-97 (Preliminary Ruling); Reyners v. Belgian State (Case 
No. 2/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 631, 656 (Preliminary Ruling); Van Binsbergen v. 
Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid (Case No. 33/74), 1974 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 1299, 1312-13 (Preliminary Ruling). 
21. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 36, 48(3), 56(1). 
28. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 877 /82, suspending imports of all products 
originating in Argentina, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 102) I (Apr. 16, 1982); Council Regula-
tion {EEC) No. 1176/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) I (May 18, 1982); Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No. 1254/82, 2S O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 146) I (May 25, 1982); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 1577/82, 2S O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 177) I (June 22, 1982). The 
embargo regulations were formally binding on all the Member States, but neither the second 
nor the third regulation was applied by Italy and Ireland; these two Member States invoked 
article 224. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 224 (covering certain grave situations in which 
Member States may have to act individually). Denmark also invoked article 224, but applied 
the sanctions on the basis of a national statute, specifically enacted to avoid recourse to the 
Council Regulations. For a detailed discussion of the embargo against Argentina, see Kuyper, 
Community Sanctions Against Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and International Law, 
in EsSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 141 (D. O'Keeffe & H.G. Schermers eds. 
1982); see also Stein, European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a Component of the European 
Foreign Affairs System, 43 ZAoRV 49, 64-68 (1983). 
29. In particular, the general safeguard clause in article 226 became obsolete at the end of 
the transitional period. 
30. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 108, 109, 115. 
31. See Decision of the Commission 68/406/EEC, authorizing the French Republic to 
take certain protective measures in accordance with article 108(3) of the EEC Treaty, 11 J.O. 
COMM. EuR. (No. L 295) IO (Dec. 7, 1968) [Author's translation. - Ed.]. This Decision is still 
in force. 
32. 'Sei! EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 138(2); Act concerning the election of the represen-
tatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, art. 2, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 5 
(Oct. 8, 1976). 
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Economic and Social Committee, 33 the number of votes accorded each 
member of the Council,34 the scales for the original financial contribu-
tions,35 and the institutional arrangements for the European Investment 
Bank.36 
6. Some Treaty provisions contain special rules for certain disadvan-
taged regions; these regions are either defined in general terms (so that all 
Member States can benefit from them)37 or specifically designated (so that 
only one Member State can invoke the exception).38 
7. Treaty provisions that apply only to one Member State are particu-
larly interesting in the context of the present study. Traditionally, these ex-
ceptions and derogations are relegated to protocols attached to the Treaty. 
Some of them are limited in time;39 others expire at a certain date unless 
they are extended in accordance with a special procedure;40 a third category 
of derogations continue to apply until the Council decides to abolish 
them.41 Finally, there are exceptions of a permanent nature.42 
8. Only one provision (which has the rank of primary Community law, 
though it was adopted under the authority of the Treaty) expressly autho-
rizes a typical "two speed" operation. We refer to Article 4(6) of the Deci-
sion on own resources, which deals with the financial aspects of so-called 
"supplementary research programmes."43 In contrast to normal research 
programmes, supplementary research programmes are financed only by 
some Member States. 
B. Flexibility and .D[fferentiated Application of Secondary Community 
Law 
Contrary to what one would expect, differentiation is to be found in all 
areas of the Community's activities, even in the most integrated parts, such 
33. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 194. 
34. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 148. 
35. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 200. 
36. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment 
Bank, arts. 4, I I. 
37. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 92(3)(a). 
38. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 82, 92(2)(c); see also Documents concerning 
the accession to the European Communities, Jan. 22, 1972, Protocol No. 4 on Greenland, 15 · 
J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 73) 165 (Mar. 27, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Act of Accession of 
1972]. 
39. E.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, Protocol on the Tariff quota for imports of raw coffee; 
Act of Accession of 1972, Protocols No. 6 & 7 concerning Ireland, supra note 38, at 166-67, 
168-69, and Protocol No. 18 on the import of New Zealand butter and cheese into the United 
Kingdom,supra note 38, at 173-74 (the latter Protocol is limited in time as to the provisions for 
cheese). 
40. E.g., Act of Accession of 1972, Protocol No. 18 on the import of New Zealand butter 
and cheese into the United Kingdom, supra note 38, at 174 (as to the provisions for butter). 
41. E.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, Protocol on the tariff quota for import of bananas. 
42. E.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, Protocol on German internal trade and connected 
problems. 
43. Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, EURATOM, on the Replacement of Financial 
Contributions from Member States by the Communities' own Resources, [Eng. Special Ed. 
1970 (I)] OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 94/19) 224 (Apr. 28, 1970). 
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as the common agricultural policy. Likewise, differentiation is not limited 
to decisions or directives, but is as often to be found in regulations, in spite 
of their definition as instruments of "general application" that are "applica-
ble in all Member States."44 
Twenty-five years of Community practice offer a fairly wide spectrum of 
flexibility and differentiation. We will therefore limit our expose to a few 
examples. 
I. Like the authors of the Treaty, the Council frequently applies the 
principle of progressiveness. Typical examples are: 
- the progressive elimination of differences in the level of agricultural sup-
port prices;45 
- the recent decision of the Council about the gradual abolition of mone-
tary compensatory amounts;46 
- the latest common market organization, i.e., the organization for mutton 
and lamb,47 described by the Court of Justice as "intended to assimilate the 
markets in the different Community regions gradually in order to achieve a 
uniform market and a uniform system of prices."48 
In approximating national laws, the Council frequently uses the technique 
of adopting minimum standards.49 Another way of ensuring flexibility is to 
allow Member States to choose between several solutions. These options 
can be permanent, so or they may be limited to a certain time period.51 
2. Like the Treaty, secondary Community law often contains safeguard 
clauses. Typical examples are the standardized safeguard provisions of the 
common agricultural market organization. 52 
44. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 189. 
45. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 19/62, portant etablissement graduel d'une organisa-
tion commune des marches dans le secteur des cereales, art. 6(4), 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 30) 
933, 936 (Apr. 20, 1962) (not translated into English). 
46. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 855/84 of 31 Mar. 1984 on the calculation and 
dismantling of the monetary compensatory amounts applying to certain agricultural products, 
27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 90) I (Apr. I, 1984), corrected by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
1004/84 of Apr. 10, 1984, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 2 {Apr. 13, 1984). 
47. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1837/80 on the common organization of the mar-
ket in sheepmeat and goatmeat, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 183) I (July 16, 1980). 
48. Kind KG v. EEC (Case No. 106/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2885, 2916. 
49. See, e.g., Council Directive 75/130/EEC, on the establishment of common rules for 
certain types of combined road/rail carriage of goods between Member States, 18 O.J. EUR, 
COMM. (No. L 48) 31 (Feb. 22, 1975); Council Directive 75/440/EEC, concerning the quality 
required of surface water intended for the abstraction of drinking water in the Member States, 
18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 26 (July 16, 1975). 
50. See, e.g., Council Directive 76/464/EEC, on pollution caused by certain dangerous 
substances discharged into the aquatic environment of the Community, art. 6, 19 O.J. EUR, 
CoMM. (No. L 129) 23 (May 18, 1976); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2831/77, on the fixing 
of rates for the carriage of goods by road between Member States, art. 2, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM, 
(No. L 334) 22 (Dec. 24, 1977). 
51. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2892/77, implementing in respect of own re-
sources accruing from value added tax the Decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of 
financial contributions from Member States by the Communities' own resources, art. 3, 20 O.J, 
EUR. COMM. (No. L 336) 8 (Dec. 27, 1977). 
52. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2727 /75, on the common organization of the mar-
ket in cereals, art. 26, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 281) I (Nov. I, 1975); see also Council 
Directive 77 /780/EEC, on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
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3. The Council has been even more inclined than the Treaty drafters to 
enact rules that concern all Member States but differentiate among them. 
Good illustrations are the quotas of the Regional Fund53 and the applica-
tion of the general rules on monetary compensatory amounts.54 
4. The common agricultural policy contains a number of provisions 
that refer to certain regions of the Community. Sometimes these regions 
are defined in general terms;55 in other cases, they are specifically desig-
nated. We are obviously most interested in the second group, which in-
cludes both positive Community action ( e.g., the Council Regulation on 
producer groups and associations thereof, with respect to certain French 
regions56) and negative Community action ( e.g., the exclusion of Greenland 
from the scope of the Council Directives on the protection of animals dur-
ing international transport,57 and on taxes other than turnover taxes which 
affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco58 and the exclusion of 
Greenland, together with certain German and Italian territories, from the 
scope of the Sixth Council Directive on VAT59). 
5. This leads us to the most delicate group of provisions, namely those 
which are expressly limited to one or several Member States. We can again 
distinguish between positive (i.e., operations in favor of a Member State) 
and negative ( exclusion or derogation limited to one or several Member 
States) Community action. Even more important is the distinction between 
temporary and permanent differentiation; the latter in particular raises 
problems of compatibility with the Treaty. By way of example: 
a) positive Community action: 
- the measures adopted in order to solve (temporarily) the so-called 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, art. 2(5), 20 O.J. 
EuR. COMM. (No. L 322) 30 (Dec. 17, 1977) (although couched in terms of a safeguard clause, 
this article in fact almost completely restores the freedom of the Member States). The merits 
of a general safeguard clause are discussed by Olmi, Aspects institulionnels el juridiques de 
!'elargissemenl. L 'impact sur !es institutions et le droil des Communautes europeennes, in A 
COMMUNITY OF TWELVE? THE IMPACT OF FURTHER ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 76, 104 (W. Wallace & I. Herreman eds., Cahiers de Bruges, N.S. 37, Semaine 
de Bruges, 15th, 1978). 
53. See Council Regulation EEC No. 214/79, amending Regulation EEC No. 724/75 es-
tablishing a European Regional Development Fund, art. 2, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) l 
(Feb. 9, 1979), amended on the accession of Greece by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
3325/80, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 349) 10 (Dec. 23, 1980). 
54. See Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1245/83, fixing the monetary compensatory 
amounts and certain coefficients and rates required for their application, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 135) 3 (May 23, 1983). 
55. The best known example is certainly Council Directive 75/268/EEC, on mountain and 
hill farming and farming in certain less-favoured areas, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 128) I 
(May 19, 1975). 
56. Council Regulation {EEC) No. 1360/78, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. {No. L 166) l (June 23, 
1978). 
57. Council Directive 77/489/EEC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 200) 10 (Aug. 8, 1977). 
58. Council Directive 79/32/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 10) 8 (Jan. 16, 1979). 
59. Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, on the harmonization of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of 
assessment, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 145) I (June 13, 1977); see also Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 1496/68, on the definition of the customs territory of the Community, [Eng. Special 
Ed. 1968 {II)] O.J. EUR. COMM. {No. L 238) l (Sept. 28, 1968). 
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British budget problem;6o 
- the interest subsidies granted (temporarily) to Ireland and Italy and 
linked to their participation in the European monetary system;61 
- sf ecial financial rules for British subsidies reducing the price of 
butter.6 
b) negative Community action: 
- the successive extensions of the deadline for implementation of the 
First and Second Council Directives on turnover taxes, first in favor of 
Belgium and Italy,63 and subsequently in favor of Italy alone;64 
- the longer delay in the implementation of the harmonized rules on 
nonautomatic weighing machines in favor of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland;65 
- the temporary derogation from the common rules on the lead con-
tent of petrol in favor of Ireland;66 
- the temporary derogations from the common rules on allowances 
for travelers in favor of Denmark and Ireland;67 
- the derogation from the Sixth Council Directive on VAT in favor of 
Member States that applied reduced rates and exemptions with refund on 
December 31, 1975.68 This derogation is not limited in time; it can only be 
removed by unanimous act of the Council; 
- the derogation from the common rules on crystal glass in favor of 
Germany; this derogation is permanent.69 
60. See, e.g., First Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2744/80, establishing supplementary 
measures in favour of the United Kingdom, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 284) 4 (Oct. 29, 1980), 
adopted to that effect. 
61. Council Decision 79/691/EEC, applying Regulation (EEC) No. 1736/79 on interest 
subsidies for certain loans granted under the European monetary system, 22 O.J. EUR, COMM, 
(No. L 200) 18 (Aug. 8, 1979). 
62. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 880/77, on the granting of a consumer subsidy for but• 
ter, 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 106) 31 (Apr. 29, 1977). 
63. Third Council Directive 69/463/EEC, on the harmonization of legislation of Member 
States concerning turnover taxes - introduction of value added tax in Member States, [Eng. 
Special Ed. 1969 (II)] O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 320/34) 551 (Dec. 20, 1969). 
64. Fourth Council Directive 71/401/CEE, en matiere d'harmonisation des legislations 
des Etats membres relatives aux taxes sur le chiffre d'affaires - Introduction de la taxe a la 
valeur ajoutee en Italie, 14 J.O. EuR. COMM. (No. L 283) 41 (Dec. 24, 1971); Fifth Council 
Directive 72/250/CEE, en matiere d'harmonisation des legislations des Etats membres rela• 
tives aux taxes sur le chiffre d'affaires - Introduction de la taxe a la valeur ajoutee en Italie, 15 
J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 162) 18 (July 18, 1972) (neither translated into English), 
65. Council Directive 73/360/EEC, on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to nonautomatic weighing machines, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 335) I (Dec, 5, 
1973). 
66. Council Directive 78/611/EEC, on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States concerning the lead content of petrol, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 197) 19 (July 22, 
1978). 
67. Third Council Directive 78/1032/EEC, on the harmonization of provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action relating to the rules governing turnover tax and 
excise duty applicable in international travel, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 366) 28 (Dec, 28, 
1978). 
68. Sixth Council Directive 77 /388/EEC, on the harmonization of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of 
assessment, art. 28, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 145) I, 20-21 (June 13, 1977). 
69. Council Directive 69/493/EEC, on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
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6. Secondary Community law offers no examples of the nonparticipa-
tion of a Member State in the decisionmaking process.70 A precedent can, 
however, be found in the 1972 Act of Accession. According to article 109, 
the substantive provisions of the so-called Yaounde II Convention71 be-
tween the Community and certain African States and Madagascar were not 
to be applied by the three new Member States; as a consequence, under 
article 114 the new Member States were not entitled to participate in deci-
sionmaking in the Council and in the Committee of the European Develop-
ment Fund with respect to that Convention.72 
7. Existing Community law illustrates both options set out in Part I with 
respect to the problems of financing "two speed" operations.73 The supple-
mentary research programmes, for example, are funded, according to Arti-
cle 4(6) of the Decision on own resources, by means of financial 
contributions from the Member States concerned. On the other hand, the 
interest subsidies granted to Ireland and Italy, which are linked to their 
participation in the European monetary system, are paid out of the Com-
munity budget; the United Kingdom's share of the cost of these subsidies is 
reimbursed.74 
C. Decisions ef the Court ef Justice 
We have identified one opinion under article 228 and several judgments 
which deal directly with problems of differentiated application. The opin-
ion is concerned with institutional aspects, the judgments with questions of 
substantive law. 
I. In its advisory opinion on a draft agreement establishing a European 
"laying-up" fund for inland waterway vessels,75 the Court of Justice ex-
amined the institutional arrangements for the management of the fund. It 
criticized particularly the composition and the functioning of the Supervi-
sory Board. The Board was designed to consist of one representative from 
each Member State except lreland;76 decisions were to be taken normally 
by a simple majority, but this majority had to include the affirmative vote of 
certain Member States. The Court declared that these provisions "alter in a 
manner inconsistent with the Treaty the relationships between Member 
States relating to crystal glass, [Eng. Special Ed. 1969 (II)] O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 326/36) 
599 (Dec. 29, 1969). 
70. q: Part I-C-5 supra. Bui see Part II-C-1 infra. 
71. Convention of Association between the European Community and Associated African 
States and Madagascar, July 29, 1969, [Eng. Special Ed. 2d Series 1(2)] O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 
L 282) 1 (Dec. 28, 1970). 
72. Act of Accession of 1972, supra note 38, arts. 109, 114. 
73. See Part I-C-4 supra. 
74. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1736/79, on interest subsidies for certain loans granted 
under the European monetary system, art. 8, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 200) 1, 2 (Aug. 8, 
1979); Commission Answer to Written Question No. 1390/83 by Mr. Pearce, 27 O.J. EUR. 
COMM. (No. C 52) 29 (Feb. 23, 1984). 
75. Advisory Opinion 1/76, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 741. 
76. According to the Opinion, Ireland had ;xpressed the wish not to be represented. 1977 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 758. We must deduce that consensus is not an argument to legalize an 
otherwise illegal arrangement. 
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States wit!tin the context of the Community."77 
2. I.n.Holtz & Wi//emsen GmbH v. Council and Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities,18 the Court examined the legality of an additional sub-
sidy introduced by a Council Regulation limited to oil seeds harvested in 
the Community and produced in Italy. The Court's reasoning is of such 
fundamental importance to our subject that we will quote it in full: 
The objectives referred to in Article 40 of the Treaty, that is the estab-
lishment of a common agricultural policy and a common organization of 
agricultural markets, presupposes [sic] the adoption of common rules and 
criteria and the consequent exclusion of any discrimination based on the 
nationality or locality of the oil mills. 
In this light the various factors in the common organization of the mar-
kets, protective measures, aids, subsidies, etc. may be distinguished accord-
ing to the areas and other conditions of production or consumption only in 
terms of criteria of an objective nature which ensure a proportionate distri-
bution of advantages and disadvantages for those concerned without dis-
tinguishing between the territory of Member States. 
Additional subsidies limited to oil mills established in one of the Mem-
ber States are therefore in general incompatible with the objectives of the 
common agricultural policy in so far as they are not justified by circum-
stances special to the whole of the national market in question. 
At its initiation however the common organization of the market may 
not completely measure up to the objectives listed in Article 39 of the 
Treaty and may contain gaps capable of endangering the stability of the 
market in a part of the Community. 
Although it is incumbent upon the institutions responsible to seek with 
all due diligence the causes of such difficulties and to adapt the regulations 
on the common organization of the markets' as soon as possible to remedy 
the defects revealed, they are at liberty, in the meantime, to take provi-
sional measures, which are limited to those Member States in which the 
market has been more particularly affected.79 
3. The judgment of the Court of Justice in Milac GmbH v. Hauptzo//amt 
Freiburg80 discussed the legality of differentiated intervention prices for 
skimmed-milk powder and so-called corrective amounts intended to neu-
tralize the price differences. The Court repeated the first two paragraphs of 
ground 13 of the Holtz & Wi//emsen decision and added: "Therefore the 
principle of non-discrimination between producers or consumers within the 
Community is one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty which must 
77. 1977 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 757 (grounds 9, 10). The Court's criticism goes much 
further. It considers the results of the negotiations "incompatible with the requirements im-
plied by the very concepts of the Co=unity and its common policy." 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. at 757 (ground 8). "The Court is of the opinion that the structure thereby given to the 
Supervisory Board and the arrangement of the decision-making procedure within that organ 
are not compatible with the requirements of unity and solidarity." 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
at 758 (ground 12). We do not believe, however, that this criticism is pertinent in this context, 
as it relates to the quite different problem of substitution of Member States for the Community 
and its institutions. 
78. (Case No. 153/73), 1974 E. Comm. Cf. J. Rep. 675. 
79. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 695 (grounds 13-14). 
80. (Case No. 8/78), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1721 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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be observed by any court."81 
4. A third decision, S.p.A. Eridania v. Minister of Agriculture and For-
estry, 82 examined the legality of a derogation in favor ofltaly to "alter" the 
production quotas for sugar "in so far as is necessary for the implementa-
tion of restructuring plans for the beet and sugar sectors."83 The essential 
argument of the plaintiff was again discrimination. Without referring to the 
Holtz & Willemsen or Milac decisions the Court stated: "Discrimination 
within the meaning of Article 40 of the Treaty cannot occur if inequality in 
the treatment of undertakings corresponds to an inequality in the situations 
of such undertakings."84 In concreto, the Court finds that the differences in 
treatment are "based on objective differences arising from the underlying 
economic situations; they cannot be considered discriminatory."85 
5. In Kind KG v. EEC,86 the Court of Justice was confronted with the 
new common market organization for mutton and lamb and its various in-
tervention mechanisms. Referring to earlier decisions, the Court recalled 
that different treatment may not be regarded as discrimination "unless it 
appears to be arbitrary, or in other words, as stated in other judgments, 
devoid of adequate justification and not based on objective criteria."87 
6. It may be useful to add that none of the Court's decisions dealing 
with problems of differentiated application mentions the principle of the 
universality of Community law (the "principe d'unicite") to which the Com-
mission's text of 1978 refers.88 The Court's judgments confirm, however, 
the view that differentiation is not confined to directives and decisions. The 
decision in La Compagnie d'Approvisionnement v. Commission89 is particu-
larly instructive, leaving no doubt that the regulations concerning trade 
with France after the devaluation of the French franc are real regulations. 
D. Theoretical Analysis 
On the basis of our findings of fact with respect to primary Community 
law, the practice of Community institutions, and the decisions of the Court 
of Justice, we will try to approach the problem of differentiated application 
in a more general theoretical manner. 
81. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1732-33 (ground 18). 
82. (Case No. 230/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2749 (Preliminary Ruling). 
83. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2765. 
84. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2767 (ground 18). 
85. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2768 (ground 19). 
86. (Case No. 106/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2885. 
87. 1982 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. at 2921 (ground 22). 
88. See Enlargement of the Community,supra note 2, ~ 52, at 17; Part I-Dsupra. The same 
principle is invoked by Dewost,supra note 19, who deduces it from articles 3, 7 and 189 of the 
EEC Treaty. Is it possible that the so-called universality principle is influenced by the need, 
emphasized by the Court, to ensure uniform and simultaneous application of Community law 
throughout the Community? See Felli Variola SpA v. Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze 
(Case No. 34/73), 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 981, 992 (Preliminary Ruling). It should be 
noted, however, that in this last case we are dealing with the relationship between Community 
law and national law, i.e., the notions of direct effect and supremacy of Community law. 
89. Compagnie d'Approvisionnement de Transport et de Credit v. Commission (Case No. 
65/69), 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 229, 234. 
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1. The starting point is simple. With the exception of article 4(6) of the 
Decision on own resources concerning supplementary research pro-
grammes, primary Community law is silent on the subject. Whether and to 
what extent differentiation is allowed is therefore a matter of interpretation. 
2. Secondary Community law must conform to the general tasks of the 
Community90 and to the more specific objectives assigned to its different 
policies.91 Grabitz and Langeheine92 have shown that differentiation is not 
per se incompatible with these tasks and objectives. Even if the Treaty does 
not expressly enumerate the specific objectives of a certain activity, those 
objectives can normally be deduced by interpretation. For example, article 
100 would clearly be infringed if a differentiating directive, instead of ap-
proximating the laws of Member States, were to aggravate existing differ-
ences;93 the same would apply if a directive based on article 54(3)(g) were 
to make existing safeguards more divergent.94 
3. Secondary Community law must conform to general principles of 
Community law. In essence, this means in our context that differentiated 
applications must respect the principle of nondiscrimination.95 Since we 
are examining the limits of differentiation, we are not concerned with the 
problem that a uniform rule might be illegal because it does not take into 
account existing inequalities. We are faced with the opposite question: are 
the differences in the rule illegal because the situations to which the rule 
applies are the same or can the differences in the rule be justified by existing 
inequalities? 
It is well known that categorizing facts for the purpose of the nondis-
crimination test is one of the most difficult tasks that a lawyer has to face. 
He has not only to establish whether there are factual differences; he has 
also to determine whether those differences are relevant or irrelevant in the 
light of the Community legal system in which he operates. The Community 
legal order is obviously not a "neutral" legal system. It is permeated by the 
general tasks of articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, particularly the assignment to 
establish a common market and progressively to approximate the economic 
policies of the Member States. It is in line with these objectives that Com-
munity law has a natural tendency to overlook factual differences instead of 
emphasizing them. It will therefore be difficult to argue that the Commu-
nity legislature has violated the principle of nondiscrimination in adopting 
a uniform rule, in spite of natural differences; the goals of the Treaty estab-
lish a sort of presumption in favor of uniformity. 
This does not mean, however, that Community institutions are not enti-
90. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 2, 3. 
91. E.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 39 (the common agricultural policy). 
92. See Grabitz & Langeheine, supra note 5; Langeheine, supra note 6. 
93. This example is taken from Enlargement of the Community, supra note 2, at 17, 
94. This example is given by Olmi, supra note 52, at 105. 
95. See Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen (Nos. 117/76, 
16/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1753, 1769 (Preliminary Ruling); see also H.O. Wagner v. 
Bundesanstalt for landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (Case No. 8/82), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J, 
Rep. 371, 387 (Preliminary Ruling); Moulins et Huileries de Pont-a-Mousson v. Office Na-
tional Interprofessionnel des Cereales (Nos. 124/76, 20/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1795, 
1811 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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tled to take into account factual differences in pursuing their efforts to reach 
the goals of the Treaty. But the essential question remains: what are those 
factual - or, in the words of the Court of Justice, "objective" - differences 
that justify differentiation? 
Without going into details, we would like to suggest that under existing 
Community law a fundamental distinction must be made between eco-
nomic and social factors on the one hand and political phenomena on the 
other. Economic and social differences (both terms used in the widest 
sense) can in principle justify differentiation; purely political phenomena 
cannot.96 For instance, the fact that the British government (or the major-
ity in Parliament or even public opinion in the United Kingdom) is op-
posed to joining the European monetary system would not be a valid 
argument for differentiation (provided the rules governing the EMS were 
Community law). However, if the British pound were still in a special posi-
tion compared with other currencies, a case could be made for a derogation 
in favor of the United Kingdom. This distinction and the resulting limita-
tion on differentiation are essentially what make it impossible, de /ege /ata, 
to use the "two speed" concept. A Treaty amendment would be necessary 
in order to vitiate the distinction. 
It is obvious that the existence of legitimate, factual (objective) differ-
ences is not enough, in itself, to justify any differentiation. The difference 
in treatment has to be proportionate to the differences in the factual (objec-
tive) situations. Also, since differences that exist today may disappear or 
diminish tomorrow, the differentiated rule must be adaptable to changing 
circumstances.97 
The nondiscrimination test must also be applied to all differentiating 
rules, i.e., including those which grant a certain Member State a longer pe-
riod for implementation. Even if in view of the principle of progressiveness 
or gradualness such an extension is relatively benign, it should be justified 
by objective differences.98 
We are convinced - as indicated earlier99 - that the answer to the 
question of discrimination has to be independent of the type of decision-
making process (consensus or majority voting). Discrimination does not 
disappear because there is assent! 
4. One might ask whether, in addition to the principle of nondiscrimi-
nation, the Community legislature must respect a prohibition of distortion 
of competition. We do not believe that a separate general principle of this 
kind exists; it is included within the principle of nondiscrimination. 
5. Secondary Community law must also be in conformity with the spe-
96. See Dewost, supra note 19, at 264. 
97. Whether the same is true where the factual situation remains unaltered is examined in 
Part 11-D-6 infra. 
98. Olmi, supra note 52, at 106, seems to require respect of the nondiscrimination principle 
only with respect to substantive rules, not for the granting of a longer deadline for 
implementation. 
99. See Part I-B supra. More generally, we do not agree with Langeheine's insufficient 
considerations with respect to the discrimination problem. See Langeheine, supra note 6, at 
239. His earlier publication hardly mentions the problem. See Grabitz & Langeheine, supra 
note 5, at 41. 
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cific prohibitions enunciated by the Treaty in order to establish the Com-
mon Market. It is true that according to their wording these prohibitions 
are addressed to the Member States. However, article 9 ("The Community 
shall be based upon a customs union ... which shall involve the prohibi-
tion between Member States of customs duties on imports and exports and 
of all charges having equivalent effect . . . .") and articles 30 and 34 
("Quantitative restrictions . . . shall . . . be prohibited between Member 
States.") express fundamental rules which must be respected by Commu-
nity institutions also. 100 The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the prohibi-
tions enunciated in articles 48, 52 and 59.101 
These considerations explain the conclusions of the Court of Justice in 
Societe Les Commissionnaires Reunis v. Receveur des Douanes:102 
It is clear from all these provisions and their relationship inter se that the 
extensive powers, in particular of a sectorial and regional nature, granted 
to the Community institutions in the conduct of the Common Agricultural 
Policy must, in any event as from the end of the transitional period, be 
exercised from the perspective of the unity of the market to the exclusion of 
any measure compromising the abolition between Member States of cus-
toms duties and ~uantitative restrictions or charges or measures having 
equivalent effect. 1 3 
Until recently, the only exception to this rule admitted by the Court of Jus-
tice concerned monetary compensatory amounts. 104 In Kind KG v. EEC, 105 
the Court went a step further: it accepted the legality of the so-called 
"claw-back," a tax charged on all exports of mutton and lamb from Mem-
ber States that have opted for a support system operating through subsidies 
to farmers. The reasoning of the Court, justifying the claw-back despite the 
prohibition of charges having equivalent effect and the requirement of con-
ditions for trade similar to those existing in a national market, is general 
and could be applied to other situations. But it is strongly colored by the 
100. See Syndicat national des fabricants raffineurs d'huile~ de graissage v. Groupment 
d'interc:t economique "Inter-Huiles" (Case No. 172/82), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 555, 571-
72 (opinion of Mrs. Advocate General Rozes); Yoshida v. Kamer van Koophandel en 
Fabrieken voor Friesland (Case No. 34/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 115, 147-48 (Prelimi-
nary Ruling) (opinion of Mr. Advocate General Capotorti); Simmenthal v. Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato (Case No. 70/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1453, 1470 (Prelimi-
nary Ruling); see also REWE v. Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland (Case No. 37 /83) (Ct. J. 
Eur. Comm. Feb. 29, 1984, not yet published), digested in 1984 PROC. CT. J. EUR. COMM., No. 
7/84, at 7, 8 (Feb. 27-Mar. 2). 
IOI. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 48 (secures freedom of movement for workers), art. 52 
(protects freedom of establishment), art. 59 (abolishes restrictions on freedom to provide 
services). 
102. (Nos. 80/77, 81/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 921;seealso Commission v. Council 
(Case No. 218/82) (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. Dec. 13, 1983), 1984 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 
~ 14,019, digested in 1983 ECJR 126 (concerning the allocation and administration under the 
Lome Convention of a Community tariff quota for rum). 
103. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 946-47. 
104. See Societe Les Commissionaires Reunis S.a.r.l. v. Receveur des Douanes (Nos. 80, 
81/77), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 927, 947 (ground 37); see also Balkan-Import-Export 
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof (Case No. 5/73), 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1091, 
1112-13 (preliminary ruling); Rewe-Zentral AG v. Hauptzollamt Kehl (Case No. 10/73), 1973 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1175, 1192 (preliminary ruling). 
105. (Case No. 106/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2885, 2920, 2922 (grounds 21 & 27). 
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particular circumstances of the case, namely the belated - and extremely 
difficult - establishment of a common market organization for mutton and 
lamb, and its progressive character. 106 
Unlike the violation of the principle of nondiscrimination, the prohibi-
tion against restrictions within the Community does not directly affect the 
legality of rules that differentiate among Member States. But this prohibi-
tion makes it impossible to use certain methods (like charges and measures 
having equivalent effect) without which differentiation cannot work. Be-
cause prohibition is both stricter and more demanding than the principle of 
nondiscrimination, it is probably a more efficient limitation on the possibili-
ties of differentiation than any general rule. 
6. A final problem concerning the question of differentiation and time 
remains to be solved. Do rules which differentiate among Member States 
have to be limited in time, and if so, what are the ultimate deadlines? In 
Holtz & Willemsen, the Court of Justice certainly took the view that the 
subsidy in favor of Italian oil mills had to be limited in time. 107 The refer-
ences in Kind KG v. EEC to the general approach of the Council, its aim to 
achieve a uniform market by degrees and the developing character of the 
common market organization, 108 are signs pointing in the same direction. 
It should be noted, however, that the regulation establishing the common 
market organization for mutton and lamb does not contain a deadline ter-
minating the initial differentiation. 
What is the legal explanation for the requirement of a deadline? Is it 
that objective differences which initially justified different treatment - and 
which persist - are no longer legitimate? Or does the requirement of a 
time limit flow from the obligation on the Council to act within a certain 
period (like the obligation under article 40 to establish during the transi-
tional period a common organization of agricultural markets for all prod-
ucts or under article 75(l)(a) and (b), to lay down common rules and 
conditions for a common transport policy)? Or is the obligation to put an 
end to differentiation inherent in the notion of the Community? 
We must admit that we find these questions even more difficult than the 
application of the nondiscrimination principle. There is no hard and fast 
rule or easy answer; rather, the solution will depend on a series of factors 
which have to be evaluated together. The two most important factors are 
certainly the type of situation which justifies differentiation and the exist-
ence (or absence) of an obligation to act. While natural differences (like 
climate and distance) are likely to justify permanent differentiation, situa-
tions that are the product of the historical development of human societies 
are more likely to call for only temporary differentiation. This is particu-
106. The difficulties preceding the adoption of the common market organization for mut-
ton and lamb in 1980 are illustrated by the decisions of the Court of Justice in Commission v. 
France (Case No. 232/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2729, as well as the Commission's 
attempt to obtain interim measures by the Court in Commission v. France (Nos. 24, 97 /80), 
1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1319. 
107. See Part II-C-2 supra. 
108. See Kind KG v. EEC (Case No. 106/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2885, 2921-22 
(grounds 24 & 27). 
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larly so if they are at the root of differentiation in areas where the Commu-
nity has a precise obligation to act in order to bring about a certain result. 
Another factor that has to be taken into account is the consequence of 
differentiation. Differentiation which is unlimited in time but which leads 
to interference with one of the fundamental freedoms is certainly more dif-
ficult to justify than the same type of differentiation in peripheral areas of 
the common market. However, this factor must not be overrated. We must 
remember that the Court of Justice has upheld the claw-back and the sys-
tem of monetary compensatory amounts, neither of which is limited in 
time. Finally, there is the ideal of the Community itself. Together with 
other factors, it will be a powerful argument in favor of a time limit; yet it 
will hardly suffice alone - unless one succumbs to the temptation to take 
one's personal wishes for legal stringency.109 
7. Let us assume that the Council has adopted a rule that legitimately 
differentiates among Member States; it has decided against a time limit 
though it was legally bound to establish one. What are the consequences of 
such an omission? Does it affect the legality of the rule, 110 and if so, from 
the very beginning or only from the date which the Council should have 
fixed? Or is the omission without consequences for the differentiating rule, 
but simply the source of an action for failure to act? 111 
The answer to these questions is obviously influenced by the solution to 
the problem discussed above. If the requirement of a time limit flows from 
the notion of discrimination, the legality of the differentiating rule is cer-
tainly at issue. But if this requirement is rather the result of an obligation 
on the Council to act within a certain period, might it not be more appro-
priate to use article 175? 
III. CONCLUSION 
We will not answer this last question, as we have not been able to solve 
the preceding, more fundamental problem. We hope, however, to have 
shown that the scope for differentiation in existing Community law is con-
siderable. It is probably greater than most observers believe. Its exact lim-
its depend essentially on three key questions: the principle of 
nondiscrimination; the prohibition of obstacles within the Community; and 
the more or less open question of the extent to which differentiation must be 
limited in time. 
Because existing Community law leaves considerable room for differen-
tiation, there is much less need for the introduction of the "two speed" con-
cept than is normally assumed. Even more important, however, are the 
complexities of any Treaty amendment intended to legalize this concept. 
The "threshold" for such an amendment is very high indeed. It seems, 
109. Olmi, supra note 52, at 105-06, seems to take a different view. It should, however, be 
noted that he does not require immediate respect of the principle of nondiscrimination. See 
note 98 supra. 
110. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 173 (providing for challenge before the Court of 
Justice of the legality of Council acts). 
111. See EEC treaty, supra note 4, art. 175 (providing for challenge before the Court of 
Justice of the Council's failure to act after demand has been made). 
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therefore, safe to assume that the "two speed" concept will never become 
the subject matter of a formal Treaty amendment. 
That does not mean, however, that the Community will never use de 
facto methods which might be very close to this concept, even while deny-
ing what it is doing. It will defend its actions on the basis of the existing 
possibilities of differentiation. Experience will finally show how wide these 
are. 
